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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 14-1070 
________________ 
 
BAYSHORE FORD TRUCK SALES INC, a Delaware corporation; 
MOTOR CITY TRUCKS, INC., a Delaware corporation; COLONY 
FORD TRUCK CENTER, INC., a Rhode Island corporation, individually 
and on behalf of all others similarly situated 
 
v. 
 
FORD MOTOR COMPANY 
 
 
     Allegheny Ford Truck Sales; All-State Truck Sales; 
     Atlantic Ford Truck; Bedford Ford; Bi-State Ford;  
     Ford Truck Sales; Bondy’s Ford; Bridgehaven Ford 
     Truck Sales; Broadway Ford Truck Sales; Carl   
     Beasley Ford; Central Ford Truck Sales; Chesapeake 
     Ford Sales Truck; Country Ford Trucks; Cresent Ford 
     Trucks; Crossroads Ford; Dave Syverson Ford; Don 
     Sanderson Ford; Don’s Truck Sales; Elliot-Wilson 
     Capitol Truck; Freedom Ford Truck Center; Friend  
     Motor  Sales; Gabrielli Ford; Gateway Motors; Gator  
     Ford; Golden State Ford; Graham Ford; Harr Ford;  
     Heintzelman’s Trucks; Hubco Ford Truck Sales;  
     Interstate Ford Truck; Kayser Ford; Keystone Ford  
     Truck Sales; L&S Truck Sales; La Crosse Truck  
     Center; Lee Smith Ford; Leif Johnson Ford Truck  
     City; LJL Truck Center; Manderbach Ford; Merle  
     Kelly Ford; Mid Tenn Ford Truck Sales; Miramar  
     Ford Truck Sales; Mission Valley Ford Truck Sales;  
     Mountain State Ford Truck Sales; Murray’s Ford;  
     Orange Motor Co.; Palmetto Ford Truck Sales; Peck  
     Road Ford Truck Sales; Piedmont Ford Trucks;   
     Prestige Ford; River City Ford Truck Sales; Salinas  
     Valley Ford Sales; Southland Truck Center; Sunbury  
     Motor Company; Treadwell Ford; Tri-Point Ford  
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     Truck Sales; Tri-State Ford Trucks; Truck Center;  
     V&H; Valley Ford Truck Sales; Wabash Ford Truck  
     Sales; Wolverine Ford Trucks Sales, 
 
         Appellants 
  
________________ 
 
On Appeal from the District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-99-cv-00741)  
District Judge: Honorable Jose L. Linares 
________________ 
 
Argued: March 4, 2015 
 
Before: AMBRO, SCIRICA, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: April 14, 2015) 
 
 
Eric L. Chase, Esq. 
Bressler, Amery & Ross 
325 Columbia Turnpike 
Suite 301 
Florham Park, NJ  07932 
 
Steven M. Klepper, Esq. 
James P. Ulwick, Esq. [ARGUED] 
Kramon & Graham 
One South Street 
Suite 2600, Commerce Place 
Baltimore, MD  21202 
 
 Counsel for Appellants 
 
Paul J. Halasz, Esq. 
Dennis LaFiura, Esq. 
Day Pitney 
One Jefferson Road 
Parsippany, NJ  07054 
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Sean M. Marotta, Esq. 
Dominic F. Perella, Esq. [ARGUED] 
Hogan Lovells US 
555 Thirteenth Street, N.W. 
Columbia Square 
Washington, DC  20004 
 
 Counsel for Appellee 
 
 
________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge 
Sixty-three heavy-duty truck dealers with a Heavy Truck Sales and Service 
Agreement (“SSA”) with Ford Motor Company appeal the denial of their motion for 
relief from judgment under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59 and 60. We will affirm.1 
I. 
 Seventy-four dealers sued Ford in federal court for breach of the SSA. Because 
each dealer had effectively the same SSA agreement with Ford, the District Court 
certified the dealers as a class for determination of Ford’s liability for alleged breach of 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 over this action arising 
under the Automobile Dealer’s Day in Court Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221–1225, and exercised 
supplemental jurisdiction over Appellants’ state law claims, including the breach of 
contract claim at issue here, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Our jurisdiction is under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291. We review the denial of a motion to alter or amend a judgment for abuse of 
discretion. Montgomery County v. Microvote Corp., 320 F.3d 440, 445 (3d Cir. 2003).  
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the SSA. The court held Ford breached the SSA and entered partial summary judgment 
for the seventy-four class member dealers on the issue of liability. Finding plaintiffs’ 
expert’s damages model produced intra-class conflicts, the court later decertified the class 
as to damages. The liability class, however, remained intact at all times. In a single 
bellwether trial, a jury then awarded eleven members of the liability class—the three 
class representatives and eight other class members (the “bellwether” dealers)—$29 
million in damages. Expecting the bellwether appeal would facilitate the resolution of the 
remaining sixty-three dealers’ claims, the court subsequently entered final judgment 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) in favor of the eleven bellwether 
dealers. Ford appealed the denial of its motion for summary judgment on the issue of 
liability and the jury’s damages award.  
 In a nonprecedential opinion in Bayshore Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Ford Motor 
Co., 540 F. App’x 113 (3d Cir. 2013) (Bayshore I), the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit held Ford had not breached the SSA; reversed the District Court’s 
grant of summary judgment on the issue of liability; and remanded with instructions to 
enter judgment on liability in Ford’s favor. On remand, the District Court entered a 
judgment holding Ford not liable with regard to the entire class. The remaining sixty-
three members of the liability class then moved for relief from judgment under Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure 59 and 60. The court denied their motion on the ground that all 
class members were bound by Bayshore I’s resolution of liability in favor of Ford. On 
appeal, the sixty-three dealers contend they are not bound by Bayshore I because the 
court of appeals lacked jurisdiction over them in that case. 
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II. 
 Contending that Rule 54(b) was the basis for appellate jurisdiction in Bayshore I  
and that a Rule 54(b) judgment was not and could not have been entered in favor of the 
sixty-three dealers given they had no jury award as to damages, the sixty-three dealers 
claim the court of appeals had no jurisdiction to bind them.2 But it is undisputed that the 
eleven bellwether dealers, including the three named class representatives, were properly 
before the court of appeals in Bayshore I and that the court of appeals had jurisdiction to 
adjudicate the issue of Ford’s liability. In the context of a class action, it is well settled 
that “a person not named as a party may be bound by a judgment on the merits of the 
action, if she was adequately represented by a party who actively participated in the 
litigation.” Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 884 (2008); accord, e.g., Theisen v. City of 
Dearborn, 147 N.W.2d 720, 723-24 (Mich. Ct. App. 1967). The sixty-three dealers were 
at all times members of the liability class, and they do not argue that the eleven 
bellwether dealers in Bayshore I did not actively participate in the litigation or adequately 
represent their interests. In fact, the same counsel who represented the eleven bellwether 
dealers represented the sixty-three dealers in this appeal. For the same reasons, had the 
court of appeals in Bayshore I affirmed summary judgment in favor of the class, the 
sixty-three dealers would have prevailed on liability as class members. 
 Simply put, the sixty-three dealers ask us to determine that Ford breached the SSA 
even though Bayshore I resolved this exact same issue on the exact same facts against the 
                                              
2 The sixty-three dealers’ reliance on Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434 (3d 
Cir. 1977), is misplaced because there was no certified class in that case. Id. at 439.  
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three named class representatives and the eight other dealers.3 But a core principle of 
issue preclusion is that “later courts should honor the first actual decision of a matter that 
has been actually litigated,” 18 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller et al., Federal 
Practice and Procedure § 4416 (2d ed. Sept. 2014). The sixty-three dealers were 
adequately represented by fellow class members in Bayshore I for our determination of 
the very same issue of liability, and we are bound by that decision. 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
                                              
3 Appellants rely on Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979), but under that 
case “a fact, question or right distinctly adjudged in the original action cannot be disputed 
in a subsequent action, even though the determination was reached upon an erroneous 
view or by an erroneous application of the law.” Id. at 162 (quoting United States v. 
Moser, 266 U.S. 236, 242 (1924)).  
